{"id":2717,"date":"2024-10-15T19:32:20","date_gmt":"2024-10-15T16:32:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/soniakh.com\/?p=2717"},"modified":"2024-12-19T13:43:07","modified_gmt":"2024-12-19T11:43:07","slug":"on-being-emotional-infrastructure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/soniakh.com\/index.php\/2024\/10\/15\/on-being-emotional-infrastructure\/","title":{"rendered":"On Being Emotional Infrastructure"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

\u2018No one felt emotions before about 1830. Instead, they felt other things \u2014 \u201cpassions\u201d, \u201caccidents of the soul\u201d, \u201cmoral sentiments\"\u2019 [1]. We made a huge leap from the fog of emotional life and found ourselves as emotional \u2018data subjects whose rights and existence are conditional upon their behaviour within digital networks\u2019 [2]. What 200 years ago was considered something obscenely irrational has been successfully turned into an asset \u2013 the developers of digital platforms have studied emotional states enough to commodify them. In military campaigns, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine (before 2022 and after), commercial emotion-generating techniques have been developed to the extent of becoming a form of exhausting emotional extractivism. 

The text sews together academic views, premonitions and subjective interpretations, technical and legal data, and art sketches in order to reveal the mechanism of transforming emotions into infrastructures for cyberwar propagation. This is also an attempt to map Russia\u2019s tactics and techniques involving the occupation of ordinary citizens' imaginations to reinforce its controls in areas that it cannot destroy, erase, or capture physically.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n
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Internet<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Viacheslav Husakov, a journalist from Kherson\u2019s regional media outlet Most<\/a> (Bridge), continued to work in Kherson during its occupation by the Russian Armed Forces. He recalls quite a few shutdowns, occurrences which had specific relevance to him due to his professional reliance on communication infrastructures. In particular, he remembers the shutting down of mobile network carriers, local and country-wide internet providers in Ukraine, and power supply companies. He says that printed media stopped coming into Kherson in February 2022, when the fighting in the region began, even before the occupation of the city. Ukrainian television networks operated until April, and the Ukrainian FM radio was broadcast on-and-off throughout the city\u2019s occupation. In March 2023 the Russians \u2018took control\u2019 of Ukraine\u2019s global internet provider Kyivstar <\/em>whose internet was available till April.

\u2018The cutoffs of communications and internet started in early April, ranging from several hours to 2-3 days. Most probably, this was due to \u201cjammers\u201d, possibly connected with the movements of the occupiers\u2019 military machinery. The shutdowns did not last long but this caused certain issues in my work. The most serious internet issues began in late April. At that time, local internet providers were forced to re-route traffic to the Russian provider Miranda-Media.\u2019<\/em> [3]

Miranda-Media is a Crimea-based Internet provider founded<\/a> by Russians in 2004. As of May 2024, 80% of the entity is owned<\/a> by Luxtrans Shipping Company, and another 20% \u2014 by Russia\u2019s state-owned Rostelecom. The latter were registered<\/a> as owners on 19 February 2014, one day before Crimea’s annexation, with control of 100% of the shares<\/a>. Luxtrans became the co-owner of Miranda-Media only in 2015. Overall Miranda fulfilled<\/a> 985 state orders for the Russian government, most of them in the Crimea. This included commissions by military units, the Pogranichnik Clinic and Sanatorium (a clinic run by the Federal Security Service of Russia), and the Crimean Prosecutor\u2019s Office, as well as by hospitals, railroad authorities, and other strategic facilities.

Switching Ukrainian providers to Miranda\u2019s traffic meant that Ukrainian users would only have access to Russian resources. The Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (abbreviated as Roskomnadzor) blocks oppositional Russian resources, Ukrainian media, and foreign resources which are perceived to \u2018constitute a threat\u2019, such as Facebook and Instagram. As of May 2024, a total of over 1.7 million websites have been blocked in the Russian Federation according to an unofficial register.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0

On 4 May 2022, the owner of Kherson\u2019s major internet provider, Kherson Telecom (Skynet), Dmytro Hudz published a post on Skynet\u2019s Facebook page, stating that he had been forced to switch to Miranda\u2019s traffic as there was no other option for providing internet access to the citizens since the usual (Ukrainian) routing no longer provided any traffic.

He wrote: \u2018On 1 May I was forced to turn on the channel of the Crimean operator Miranda. In just one day, between 2-3 May, my company experienced an unexpected shock\u2026 People began to queue in huge numbers around our offices to use the network. […] On 1 May Oblenergo employees [employees of the regional electricity supplier \u2014 author\u2019s note] bid online for electric power from my office so that the region would not lose electricity. They simply did not have any other means of communication!<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Kherson residents gather at the office of Skynet to use the Internet. Photo from Skynet’s Facebook page.<\/figcaption>\n  <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n
On 13 May, the State Special Communications Service of Ukraine released a statement<\/a> that \u2018terrorists from the so-called national guard of the russian federation [sic] have seized the premises of Status, a Kherson-based company, [another Internet provider \u2014 author\u2019s note] and disconnected all communications equipment […], they are threatening the company management with the seizure of all the equipment if the management refuses to connect to the Crimean network.\u2019

Later on, Status\u2019 owner gave a statement to the Ukrainian resource dev.ua, in which<\/a> he said the same thing as Dmytro Hudz: that connecting to the Crimean network was the only way of providing internet to Kherson. According to a dev.ua post<\/a> in September 2022, Status was directly connected to Miranda. Two more local providers, Pluton and Ukrkom, were receiving traffic through Status.

\u2018They said that this way they would supposedly be able to both offer high-quality internet and increase control over the local population simultaneously<\/em>,\u2019 says Viacheslav. \u2018It was reported at the time that Russian IT geniuses had implemented some kind of tweaks to the network, thus ensuring that not a single person supporting Ukraine would be able to hide. But I think that was bravado. Occupation has several inevitable features: the first thing necessary is to make people scared, to occupy psychologically. I think that was the intention. But one thing to note is that all VPN services were functional at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, even the free ones, and then Russians blocked them, making it harder and harder to use them<\/em>.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Mobile Connection<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Generally, the mobile connection disappeared in Kherson on 30 April 2022. But \u2018islands of communication\u2019, as Viacheslav calls them, remained till early July. One network mast, operated by Lifecell, a Ukrainian branch of a worldwide mobile network operator, was situated near to the Dniprovska District Council building.

\u2018A lot of people would gather there. We would go there to call relatives. People who were paid retirement benefits at Oschadbank [Ukrainian state bank \u2014 author\u2019s note] went there because they needed to receive a message on their mobile phone, that\u2019s the procedure for getting the money. But the Russians disconnected the tower in early September and dispersed the crowds<\/em>.\u2019 says Viacheslav.

In May 2022, the occupiers started selling +7Telecom<\/a> mobile operator\u2019s cards. The SIM cards did not have any markings, nor did the operator\u2019s website<\/a> feature information about any legal entity carrying out commercial activities. According to the web archive<\/a>, for the first time, the name of the legal entity K-Telecom LLC responsible for the work of the mobile operator appeared on the website only in March 2024. At the same time, the 7telecom.ru domain is registered<\/a> in June 2022 in the name of a Russian entity, JSC IC8<\/a> (Aysi Eyt LLC) founded in May 2021 in Gelendzhik, a city in the Russian Federation. IC8 belongs to IC Invest<\/a> which also manages two Crimean mobile network operators \u2014 KTK Telecom<\/a> and K-Telecom<\/a>. All the above entities are owned<\/a> by Pavel Kuznetsov, a former manager of the Moscow companies Intellect-Telecom (which specialises in telecommunications) and Sitronics (which specialises in IT). Both projects had previously collaborated with the Russian government.

During a Crimean conference arranged for the employees of IC8, KTK Telecom, and K Telecom in September 2022, Kuznetsov himself stated<\/a> that: \u2018This is not an easy time but the challenges it brings stimulate all the hidden potential of Russian IT specialists and managers, making them totally reconsider their approaches towards the creation of new products. Now is the time to work quickly, precisely, and consistently.\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Photo from the corporate party of Russian IT specialists in Yalta (Crimea) in 2022. IC8, KTK Telecom, and K Telecom employees support the work of telecommunication companies in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine.<\/figcaption>\n  <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n
Each person in Kherson was able to buy no more than five +7Telecom cards, and had to present their passport for every purchase, so as to allow personal espionage by the occupation authorities. Viacheslav spoke about the countermeasures used by Kherson citizens: \u2018The occupiers did not take into account the inventiveness of Ukrainians! People bought the cards using their passports and resold them, so as to undermine the Russian attempts at personal espionage. I bought a card this way. I overpaid for it, but in the end it was the option to have communication at a certain point in time. Some people also purchased the cards before giving them away to Kherson volunteers for whom it would have been dangerous to reveal their data<\/em>.\u2019\u00a0

Russians even started a special campaign to counter unauthorised card resales: they warned against buying cards from individuals, raided locations, prosecuted second hand sellers, and made false claims that the cards were non-functional.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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 Russian media news concerning malfunctioning of Russian SIM cards bought from Ukrainian resellers.<\/figcaption>\n  <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n
The mobile internet offered by +7Telecom was slow, expensive, and unavailable in several areas of the city, but from September 2022, it became the only means of communication.

\u2018As a result of the limitations placed on communication networks, I noticed an informational vacuum emerging, which subsequently led to people becoming increasingly reliant on Russian sources. Somewhere around the summer ordinary Kherson residents began to sometimes adopt Russian propaganda narratives in their conversations: \u201cUkraine has forgotten about us, and we need to live on, maybe we will live somehow with \u201cthose.\u201d Whilst this was only a small portion of the population, it nonetheless indicates that for some people, the vacuum was truly filled by Russian propaganda\u2019,<\/em> Viacheslav said.

On 6 November all forms of communication networks, electricity, and water supply disappeared in Kherson. This was the Russian preparation for their so-called \u2018gesture of goodwill\u2019\u2014the retreat from Kherson.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Vacuum<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Tavriisk is the centre of an eponymous hromada (municipality) in the Kherson region, located on the left bank of the Dnipro River, about 80 kilometres from Kherson. The town was occupied on 24th February 2022, the first day of the full-scale invasion by Russia. According to Svitlana, the director of a local school, during the first days of occupation, the Russian troops were not stationed in the town itself, instead being based five kilometres away in the neighbouring town of Kakhovka. They controlled all entrances and exits to both cities. Just like in Kherson, mobile internet here would disappear sporadically throughout the occupation, and was dramatically slower than usual when it did appear. Since June 2022, uncensored internet has been available through the use of a VPN.\u00a0

\u2018The Russians checked passports at security checkpoints, and phones too, looking for pro-Ukrainian photos or comments. Only men were checked at first but later they began entering buses and checking everyone \u2014 sometimes passports, sometimes phones. And if, for instance, you were subscribed to a Ukrainian Telegram channel, you could end up \u201cin the basement\u201d [in a torture room which Russians often set up in basements \u2014 author\u2019s note]. So each time you pass this checkpoint, you need to delete everything and completely clear your history and cache. I would not say we were heavily pressured, but this uncertainty affected us because we did not know where to look for the truth. This informational vacuum was frightening, and in a way was probably the worst part of the occupation, and it is hard to explain. Despair and fear<\/em>.\u2019

Svitlana left the town on 30 June 2022. Having made the decision very quickly, she considers herself lucky, both to have been able to leave the Russian-occupied territories and to have reached Ukrainian-controlled territory quickly, with the whole journey taking under 24 hours. Having left, she continued working remotely as the director of Tavriisk School, which incorporated the schools of seven villages of Tavriisk hromada. Classes were offered to everyone who is able to access the internet. As of October 2024, there are 640 pupils, 266 of whom are in the temporarily occupied territories.\u00a0\u00a0

\u2018People went out of their way to find ways of coping. If Wi-Fi was available in a neighbouring house, then people would gather outside it, trying to connect. With increasing prices and high levels of unemployment, groups of neighbours would club together to pay for a one-month package.<\/em>

Likewise, children would wander around the streets in search of a connection. They could not connect to Google Classes because the Russian military often visited the parents of our students and conducted searches, checking phones, tablets, and computers for evidence of Ukrainian language learning. If you were found to have partaken in Ukrainian classes, you would be beaten. Upon finding a signal on the street, children would download assignments, completing them at their own risk, and then sending them away for checking.<\/em>

It is the same story with the news. Russian media narratives were obsessed with \u201cUkrainian Nazis\u201d and \u201cUkrainian fascists\u201d. They would shell us and claim the shelling had been committed by Ukrainians. Those who owned satellite televisions could watch Ukrainian channels. In the evenings, they would gather with their neighbours and share the truth of what was going on.<\/em>\u2019 says Svitlana.

All subsequent Russian actions surrounding communication in the Russian-occupied territories since our interview with Svitlana have only contributed to the further construction of a \u2018vacuum\u2019 or a kind of hybridised echo chamber \u2013 partly offline, partly online.

On 13 May 2023, Miranda Media announced<\/a> its plans to become the only telecommunications service provider in the so-called \u2018DNR\u2019 and \u2018LNR\u2019, as well as in the occupied areas of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. As of September 2024, traffic has been exchanged<\/a> between the Russian Miranda and twelve Ukrainian providers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Route propagation of Miranda Media traffic through Russian Rostelecom, May 20, 2024.<\/figcaption>\n  <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n
In July 2024, Novoe.Media, a media platform specially created for the \u2018new regions of the Russian Federation\u2019, reported<\/a> that there were two more cellular operators currently operating in the Kherson region except the already mentioned +7Telecom: Phoenix and Mirtelecom. A separate Mirtelecom domain is not operational and is registered<\/a> at RU-CENTER-RU, the Russian government registry. The same registrant has<\/a> the rights to the Phoenix domain, thus maintaining the limited selection of choices of operators in Russian-occupied territories.\u00a0

This is only the beginning of Russia\u2019s plans for \u2018vacuumisation\u2019. For instance, the \u2018Russian World<\/a>\u2019 satellite television channel, which started operating in autumn 2022, specifically for the Ukrainian temporarily occupied territories, guarantees its subscribers on occupied territories \u2018free viewing of all programmes until 31 December 2026\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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The image says: \u2018Satellite television \u201cRussian World\u201d. Free TV package for residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, the Republic of Crimea and the city of  Sevastopol. Apply here.<\/figcaption>\n  <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n
Distort, Dismay, Divide<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
A Russian soldier who randomly checks passports or smartphones at a checkpoint in the Russian-occupied territories is the best example of contemporary occupation procedures. Your passport, of course, says a lot about you, but your smartphone, which stores data on all your subscriptions and preferences, contains much more meaningful information. The only way that a Russian soldier could more effectively vet citizens by checking their Google ad cabinets.

Well-researched data [4] surrounding emotions yields massive commercial benefits for digital platforms. For an extra fee, it can help to create targeted commercial and political advertisements, using the logic of emotional extractivism. Based on this logic, digital platform users must always be excited and stirred up (angered, happy, exalted) in order to \u2018share emotions.\u2019

The notion of \u2018communicative militarism\u2019 proposed by Svitlana Matviyenko provides a comprehensive description of how digital infrastructures, using all those aligned mechanisms of provocation, are appropriated by states in the interests of cyberwar. [5]

Another Ukrainian researcher Lesia Kulchynska in the text Violence is an Image: Weaponization of the Visuality During the War in Ukraine<\/em>, describes how the very act of spreading images of atrocities committed by the Russian army in Ukraine is transformed into new weapons against the Ukrainian population.\u00a0

\u2018To transform the images of atrocities conducted by the Russian army into weapons certain infrastructure is needed as well. Which is an infrastructure of fear, or to put it more precisely, the infrastructure of power and social relations based on fear. That is an infrastructure of authoritarian rule based on the force that is operative, particularly, in contemporary Russia<\/em>.\u2019 [6]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Lesia Kulchynska goes on to talk about the feelings of guilt. This is a state experienced by a huge number of Ukrainians, in particular when photos featuring people killed and tortured in the territories occupied by Russia are spread. She analyses the use of this guilt to be an additional suppressive tactic against Ukrainians, revealing the weaponization of this emotion.

Military-industrial complexes are able to avoid spending their budgets on the machines of visualisations of our personalities \u2013 that is to say, our emotions, thoughts, feeling structures \u2013 instead only needing to pay for operators. This is because everything has been created in advance \u2013 for commercial purposes by digital platforms. However, the weaponization of users’ emotions has now reached such proportions that states are forced to provide additional budgets to counter such influence campaigns. Such military emotional campaigns are also known as FIMI \u2013 \u2018Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference\u2019.

As defined<\/a> by the European External Action Service, it is \u2018a pattern of behaviour that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact values, procedures, and political processes. Such activity is manipulative in character, and conducted in an intentional and coordinated manner. Actors of such activity can be state or non-state actors<\/em>, including their proxies inside and outside of their own territory.\u2019

Distort, Dismay, Divide.<\/em> These are just three of more than 150 separation techniques that have been categorised and described by the US-based NGO DISARM to counter such information threats. These days their framework<\/a> for counteracting is an industry standard in the US and the EU. The framework also involves response techniques, including \u2018repair[ing] broken social connections\u2019 or \u2018reduc[ing] the effect of division-enablers\u2019.

Thus, you can imagine the Russian imperial machine as a giant purchase funnel<\/a>. This marketing technique is called a funnel because it allows you to weed out those who are not ready to make a purchase by constantly narrowing it down while targeting those who are. Let’s say, in such a funnel, at the entrance, hundreds of specialists use FIMI to select offers that may be of interest to a group of people like you<\/em>. And its final purchase \u2013 is the physical occupation of your home territory.

Unfortunately, the aforementioned tactics of countering FIMI are not appropriate in the context of occupation. FIMI is a method of emotional occupation, the maintenance of which makes physical occupation possible. It is only after FIMI that all of the development of a hybrid infrastructure, where our emotions play a final decisive role \u2013 if the army of occupiers cannot destroy, erase, or capture physically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Emotions as Infrastructures and Imagination as Technology<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Emotions are ever-present in discussions surrounding communication infrastructures, but generally not in the role of the components of the infrastructures. In his article, \u201cThe Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure\u201d Bryan Larkin also gravitates toward this vision. \u2018Infrastructures are metapragmatic objects, signs of themselves deployed in particular circulatory regimes to establish sets of effects\u2019, <\/em>he writes. Still, he leaves space for interpretation in this text (namely for machine ensembles<\/em> and digital infrastructures<\/em>) \u2014 a space which we intend to fill.

In this text, Larkin quotes researcher Thomas Hughes as saying\u2018[…] Infrastructures typically begin as a series of small, independent technologies with widely varying technical standards. They become infrastructures when either one technological system comes to dominate over others or when independent systems converge into a network<\/em>.\u2019 The same thing is happening in Russian-occupied territories: influenced by a combination of physical intimidation, militarised social media marketing and Soviet-era TV propaganda, gaslighting, paranoia, and digital platforms\u2019 (meta)data \u2013 emotional states are dehumanised and forcefully appropriated for subsequent integration into the existing system of influence. So, if our emotions are already mapped, doesn’t that make them a \u2018technology with widely varying technical standards<\/em>\u2019?

Recognising that our emotions can be appropriated and become infrastructures spreading cyberwar does not mean refusing agency. On the contrary, this is a way to reinforce it. The issue of human emotions and decisions taken under their influence is not just a \u2018human factor\u2019 to which all uncertainty is traditionally attributed. This is a calculated elaborate tactic used by the occupiers. People finding themselves under the influence of informational military tactics should not be stigmatised. These are people who need more information about terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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By recognising that our emotions can be used against us, we can embrace the ability to build effective, shimmering human networks *\u02dawhich may disappear here and reappear there*\u2022 so as to create our own mixed infrastructures. We can see these networks in the neighbours who shared news from non-Russian satellite channels, or the protection of volunteers in Kherson through the anonymisation of SIM cards, or the collective purchase of a single internet package for several apartments. It is through the erection of such fragile networks that we can liberate the space of our imagination from occupation by the imperial fantasy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The text was started during the residency \u2018Bodies as Lands \u2014 Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Spatial Arrangements in Eastern Europe\u2019 held in March 2023 at <\/em>Nida Art Colony<\/em><\/a> of the Vilnius Academy of Arts and was completed during 2024 in different places in Ukraine and outside.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Editing by Ada Wordsworth.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n
\u2018fantastic little splash\u2019<\/strong> is a collective comprised of journalist\/artist Lera Malchenko and artist\/director Oleksandr Hants. \u201cfantastic little splash\u201d combines art practice and media studies to research collective imagination and emotions appropriation in technosocial systems. Group works with videos, texts and interactive game-based tools. Established in 2016 in Ukraine, their projects have been exhibited at events including transmediale, post.MoMA, Plokta TV, Ars Electronica, Liste Art Fair Basel, Construction festival VI x CYNETART, KISFF, and Docudays, among others. fantastic little splash \u2013 participants of the transmediale x Pro Helvetia Residency 2022, and the Cite\u0301 internationale des arts residency 2023.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n
Published 15 October 2024.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n
    \n
  1. Tiffany Watt Smith, The Book of Human Emotions,<\/em> (London: Profile Books, 2015).
    2. Svitlana Matviyenko and Jaime Lee Kirtz, \u201cEcho Chambers of Paranoid Knowledge: On Cyberwar Epistemology,\u201d Discourse: Journal for Theoretical Studies in Media and Culture<\/em>, Vol. 45: Iss. 3, Article 6 (2023):     https:\/\/digitalcommons.wayne.edu\/discourse\/vol45\/iss3\/6<\/a>.
    3. All comments by Viacheslav Husakov, a journalist from the Kherson media outlet Most, and Svitlana, a director of a school in Tariisk, were made in interviews with fantastic little splash.
    4. Adam D. I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory, and Jeffrey T. Hancock, \u201cExperimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks,\u201d Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, <\/em>Vol.111(24) (2014):     https:\/\/www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/pmc\/articles\/PMC4066473\/<\/a>.
    5. Svitlana Matviyenko, \u201cCyberwar and Communicative Militarism,\u201d filmed July 2021, GEPD UFRN, 1:13:23.     https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=gRu2ic5FVjs<\/a>.
    6. \u201cViolence is an Image: Weaponization of the Visuality During the War in Ukraine,\u201d Lesia Kulchynska, accessed October 2022:     https:\/\/networkcultures.org\/tactical-media-room\/2022\/10\/26\/violence-is-an-image-weaponization-of-the-visuality-during-the-war-in-ukraine-2\/<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
    <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
    \u2018No one felt emotions before about 1830. Instead, they felt other things \u2014 \u201cpassions\u201d, \u201caccidents of the soul\u201d, \u201cmoral sentiments”\u2019 [1]. We made a huge leap from the fog of emotional life and found ourselves as emotional \u2018data subjects whose rights and existence are conditional upon their behaviour within digital networks\u2019 [2]. What 200 years […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":2718,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"class_list":["post-2717","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-text"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nOn Being Emotional Infrastructure - soniakh<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/soniakh.com\/index.php\/2024\/10\/15\/on-being-emotional-infrastructure\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"On Being Emotional Infrastructure - soniakh\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"\u2018No one felt emotions before about 1830. Instead, they felt other things \u2014 \u201cpassions\u201d, \u201caccidents of the soul\u201d, \u201cmoral sentiments"\u2019 [1]. We made a huge leap from the fog of emotional life and found ourselves as emotional \u2018data subjects whose rights and existence are conditional upon their behaviour within digital networks\u2019 [2]. 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